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Abstract:
Purpose: The purpose of  this paper is to examine whether acquiring firms attempt to adopt
real earnings management strategy to upward reported earnings in the period of  M&A
announcement and provide an explanation for the underperformance of  post-M&A in share
payment M&A affairs occurring in China’s capital market from 2008-2010. 
Design/methodology/approach: The author uses Roychowdhury’s (2006) methodology to
measure the magnitude of  real earnings management of  acquiring firms in stock for stock
M&A by exploiting financial date from 2006 to 2011.The methodology includes three models,
which are cash ﬂow from operations, production costs and discretionary expenditures,
respectively. 
Findings: It was found that firms using stock as a financing medium exhibit significant
negative abnormal cash flows and abnormal discretionary expenses yet abnormal production
costs significantly positive during the current period of  M&A. Moreover, it was also
documented that acquiring firms use real activities manipulation to overstate earnings for the
purpose of  improving market confidence. Finally, a negative association was found between
REM and under-performance of  post-M&A.
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Research limitations/implications: To some extent, these results explain the puzzle of
performance decline over the following period of  post-M&A. Meanwhile, our study adds to
prior literature that capital market pressures induce acquiring firms inflate reported earnings by
manipulating real activities in stock-financed M&Aoccurring in China’s capital market.
Practical implications: The author’s result imply that investors, analysts and regulators cannot
ignore more undetectable opportunism behaviors underlying reported earnings than accrual-
based earnings management and the impact on the performance of  post-M&A when they use
financial statements to evaluate acquiring firms.
Social implications: Our study plays important role in making public policies. Furthermore, it
is necessary to improve outside supervisory mechanism and strengthen construction of
honesty and faithfulness so as to realize the main purpose of  value creation in M&A.
Originality/value: The paper extends prior literature by taking a closer look at acquiring
firms’ managerial myopia behavior in stock-financed M&A. The administrators of  acquiring
firms have strong incentives to manage earning upward by adopting a more subtle way which is
a costly means because it has value-destroying effect on performance of  post-M&A.
Keywords: share payment, real earnings management, performance of  M&A
1. Introduction
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the motivation of earnings management is to acquire private
benefits. Prior research has documented that managers emphasize the importance on
manipulating reported earnings upward or downward around several specific corporate event,
such as IPO, SEO, M&A etc. As a strategic expansion behavior, M&A activities are vitally
important for corporations. The failure of this investment usually takes the serious economic
loss. For an acquiring corporation, it makes every effort to guarantee the success of the deal in
order to realize operational synergy and increase the value of companies. The consideration
received by target shareholders is the acquiring firm’s stock in share for share corporate
takeovers. Because the accounting information and exchange ratio are closely related to share
price on or near the takeover agreement date and carry signals to investors leading to affect
their investment confidence. So when controlling owners or managers realize that if
corporation undervaluation or overvaluation can contribute the success of the deal, they have
strong incentives to manipulate reported earnings prior to the takeover in the hope of raising
the stock price, therefore reducing the cost of buying the target.
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In fact, the primary purpose of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) is to regain the public's trust in
the integrity of financial reports in order to curb earnings management opportunistic behavior.
However, because of tighter accounting standards and more stringent regulation, the decrease
in accounting discretion results in accrual-based earnings management more likely to be
detected. Therefore, more and more companies shift to real earnings management which is
more subtle to avoid the risk of being punished and litigation. Real earnings management
refers to managers’ opportunistic behavior who attempts to achieve special purpose through
making suboptimal decisions on the timing and scale of the real business activities to alter
reported accounting earnings, which misleads stakeholders’ understanding of financial report.
It attracts extensive attentions in academic and practical fields over time. Graham, Harvey and
Rajgopal (2005) argue that 80% CEOs of US firms would like to adopt real earnings
management to achieve short-term earnings targets. However, real earnings management is a
suboptimal decision which deviates from normal business practices and has a negative effect
on future performance and competitive ability (Gunny, 2010; Ewert & Wagenhofer, 2005;
Cohen, Dey & Lys, 2008; Zang, 2012). 
As an outside expansion strategy, M&A plays an important role in China’s capital market.
Examining real earnings management in the course of M&A and the consequence on
subsequent performance are very important for several reasons. First of all, Prior literatures
demonstrate that acquiring firms which adopt share payment have incentives of earnings
management before announcement of M&A (Erickson & Wang, 1999; Louis, 2004; Botsari &
Meeks, 2008). However, it is a pity that prior research focuses on accrual-based earnings
management and overlooks radically real earnings management, which may draw wrong
conclusions. Secondly, as is described in earlier literatures, real earnings management
aggravates the information asymmetry with regards to a firm's report earnings between
managers and stakeholder, thus affecting stakeholders’ estimates of a firm's value and
profitable ability. Therefore, this information risk has a potential effect on transaction price and
goes against stakeholders. Thirdly, owning to the characteristics of concealing of real earnings
management, prior studies demonstrate that it is unlikely to be detected by auditors and
regulators (Graham et al., 2005; Zang, 2012). Whether this opportunistic earnings
management behavior can be perceived is a very interesting question. Meanwhile, our study
aims to provide empirical evidence on the impact of real earnings management on post-
performance of M&A in China’s capital market.
The remainders of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of
previous related literatures and develops our research hypothesis. Section 3 describes our
empirical models. Section 4 presents date source and sample selection and Section 5 draws
the paper’s conclusion. 
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2. Theoretical Analysis, Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
2.1 Theoretical Analysis from Game Theory Perspective
Prisoner's dilemma, as one of classical cases in Game Theory, can be used to explain why
managers of acquiring firms adopt real earnings management strategy in M&A transactions.
Prior research demonstrates that the target firm exists earnings management opportunistic
behavior before M&A, therefore, acquisition audit focused on the financial statements of the
target companies. As a matter of fact, both acquiring and acquired firms fall into the prisoner's
dilemma when they make earnings management choices. Like the general commodities
trading, M&A also abides by the principle of bilateral transaction, both the parties of M&A deal
are suitors to maximize their own interests. Based on the hypothesis of rational economic men,
the acquiring company which could not adopt earnings management strategy, will pay a higher
purchase cost which will become part of the premium income of the target company while the
target company does. On the contrary, if the acquired company doesn’t adopt earnings
management strategy while the acquiring company does, the acquiring company will pay lower
purchase cost to achieve extra interest. Therefore, the rational choice of acquiring company is
to adopt earnings management strategy. In the same way, the acquired company will also
make the same choice. Based on the psychology of distrust and precaution, the both will make
earnings management decision. 
2.2 Real Earnings Management and Stock for Stock M&A
Bernard and Thomas (1990) and Chaney and Lewis (1995) find that reported accounting
earnings and stock prices are closely linked. The higher reported accounting earnings are, the
higher stock prices. The most important reason for earnings management incentive in the
course of stock for stock M&A is value relevance between stock prices and accounting
earnings, which means that accounting earnings affect stock prices having an influence on
conversion ratio in return, and conversion ratio decides acquisitions costs. Owing to higher
acquiring firm’s stock price Pre-M&A leading to lower conversion ratio, namely, acquired
company exchanges for a fewer number of acquiring company’s shares, the acquisition cost
becomes lower. Therefore, managers of acquiring firms often overstate reported earnings
before announcement of M&A. On the one hand, it aims to reduce acquisition cost through
raising share price pre-M&A; on the other hand, it can reduce diluting possibility of existing
earnings as well as voting and control rights of existing shareholders. Prior literatures have
demonstrated that acquiring firms engage in earnings inflation before announcement of M&A,
and the level of earnings management is positive related to the scale of transaction. (Erickson
& Wang, 1999; Louis, 2004; Botsari & Meeks, 2008). However, prior documents focus on
accrual-based earnings management, and overlook real earning management thoroughly.
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Recently, scholars tend to switch their research emphasis to how companies conduct real
earnings management by constructing real business activities. Roychowdhury (2006)
demonstrates that managers inﬂate earnings by overproduction and liberal credit policies and
reducing discretionary expenditures in order to avoid reporting losses or meet analyst
forecasts. Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) and Tan and Jamal (2006) suggest that companies
manipulate operating activities to adjust the underlying earnings to reach special aims when
more perfect accounting standards and more stringent supervisory regulations reduce
accounting flexibility. Real earnings management is not in violation of Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles, and the possibility of detection by regulators and auditors is lower
because of high concealment and low risk characteristics (Zang, 2012; Graham et al., 2005).
Cohen et al. (2008) argue that real earnings management significantly increases while accrual-
based earnings management goes opposite after enactment of SOX. Cohen and Zarowin
(2010) demonstrate that firms exist not only accrual-based earnings management but also real
earnings management in the course of Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEO). Stock for stock M&A
is a way to gain control rights of target firms by targeted placement. This investment is SEO in
essence and also exists motivation of earnings management. With the new Accounting
Standards formally performed in the listed company in 2007, the Enterprise Internal Control
Basic Norms implemented in 2008, and the regulations governing the purchase of public
companies, the management approach for material assets reorganization of listed companies
as well as the financial advisory business management approach for M& A of listed companies
and so on perfected M&A related laws and regulations, the space of accrual-based earnings
management is shrinking because of external supervisory power constantly heightening. Due
to information asymmetry, acquiring firms owning the information advantages tend to adjust
earnings upward before the merger announcement in the absence of outside attention in order
to prepare for the M&A success. The purpose is to reduce the exchange ratio and then reduces
acquisition cost by raising the pre-merger stock price, for which prior studies has provided
empirical evidence (Erickson & Wang, 1999; Louis, 2004; Zhao & Zhang, 2012). In the current
period, the news of M&A becomes the public information in the capital market and attracts
wide attentions from media, financial analysts and investors. Under strong market pressure
and strict regulations, acquiring company's managers switch to more concealed real earnings
management to increase reported earnings so that they can protect company and personal
reputation, convey successful signals of M&A to the capital market and ensure the company's
future business operating properly. This behavior is less easily detectable and may provide
greater manipulation space for managers (Cang, Chu & Qi, 2011). Based on the above
analysis, we put forward to the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: In the current period of M&A announcement, Acquiring firms have real
earnings management behavior to adjust reported earnings upward. 
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2.3 Real Earnings Management and Performance of M&A
Recent studies have shown that accrual-based earnings inflation pre-M&A will reverse and lead
to obvious decline in performance of post-M&A. Louis (2004)examined the relationship
between accrual-based earnings management and performance of post-M&A and provided
empirical evidence that the abnormal accrual negatively related to performance of post-M&A in
the long run. Zhang (2010) suggests that performance of acquiring firms which engage in
earnings inflation will decline owing to part of accruals reversing when the private placement is
completed. Zhao and Zhang (2012) demonstrate that upward accrual-based earnings
management of Chinese listed company prior to stock for stock M&A results in decline of
corporate performance because of the reversal of abnormal accrual post-M&A.
Academic field did not reach the consistent conclusion about the impact of real earnings
management on the company's future performance. Taylo and Xu (2010) didn’t find that real
earnings management brings about significant decline in subsequent operating performance.
Cheng (2004) suggests that limited manipulation of business activities will not affect the long-
term operating performance when real earnings management behavior happened occasionally
and reverted to its ordinary strategy next year, while it affects future performance significantly
when it happens periodically. Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) and Roychowdhury (2006) argue
that real earnings management deviates from ordinary business activities and has negative
effects on future cash flow. Real earnings management does harm to subsequent operating
performance (Gunny, 2010). Cohen and Zarowin (2010) find that real earnings management
has severer negative effects on future performance than accrual-based earnings management
around the time of SEO. Li, Dong and Lian (2011) empirically studied the consequences of
earnings management on the future performance in the course of SEO and provided evidence
that real earnings management results in under-performance of post-M&A. This article
suggests that upward accrual-based earnings management behavior pre-M&A restrict firm’s
ability to continue to adopt this method to overstate reported earnings in current period of
M&A. In order to promote the probability of M&A success and protect interests and reputations
of company and personal, the managers of acquiring firms would adopt more subtle real
earnings management to inflate earnings unceasingly which aims to convey success signal to
capital market and enhance investors’ confidence. The behavior deviates from firm’s optimal
operating decision and leads to changes in cash flow directly. The temporary deliberately
trading arrangements for increasing short-term earnings cannot last forever and give rise to
under-performance of post-M&A. Therefore, we put forward to the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: If acquiring firms engage in earnings inflation through real earnings
management in current period of M&A, the future performance of M&A will decline. 
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3. Research Design
3.1 Sample Selection and Data Sources
Our sample covers M&A affairs occurring in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share stock markets
from 2008 to 2010. We choose the first announcement date as event date, and control rights
of objects must be transferred. We obtain financial data from China Stock Market and
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. M&A affair samples are obtained from China Center
for Merger and Acquisition Research. Statistical software is Stata11. Meanwhile, we deal with
observations according to the following rules:
• We exclude acquiring firms in insurance and financial industries because of different
accounting rules and operating characteristics.
• We eliminate acquiring firms with leverage rate above 1, otherwise, ST firms and PT
firms are excluded because of special treatment.
• Acquiring Firms lacking required accounting data for research are excluded.
• All of the variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.
• We eliminate acquiring firms which are listed through buying a shell or occurring
important events. The former is different from general M&A affairs while the latter
cannot distinguish earnings management motivation.
3.2 The Measure of Real Earnings Management
We use Roychowdhury’s (2006) model to estimate real earnings management level of acquiring
firms in stock for stock M&A by exploiting financial date from 2006 to 2011. The steps are as
follows: to begin with, we estimate the normal level in cash ﬂow from operations, production
costs and discretionary expenditures respectively by running the following regression models
each year for each industry. Secondly, we derive the regression residuals from these models as
proxies for abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs and abnormal
discretionary expenditures respectively consistent with prior researches (Cohen et al., 2008;
Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012). In general, acquiring firms engaging in real earnings
management have the characteristics of low abnormal cash ﬂow from operations, high
abnormal production cost and low abnormal discretionary expenditures.
(1) The model of cash ﬂow from operations
CFO it
Ai , t−1
=k1
1
Ai ,t−1
+k2
SALE i , t
Ai , t−1
k3
SALE i , t
Ai , t−1
+ε it (1)
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(2) The model of production costs 
P RO D it
Ai , t−1
=k1
1
A i ,t−1
+k2
SALE i , t
Ai , t−1
+k3
SALE i ,t
A i , t−1
+k4
SALE i , t−1
A i ,t−1
+ε it (2)
(3) The model of discretionary expenditures 
DISX it
Ai , t−1
=k1
1
Ai , t−1
+k2
SALE i , t−1
Ai , t−1
+ε it (3)
The variables in these models are as follows: t is a period indicator, i is a firm indicator, CFO is
cash flow from operations, SALE is annual sales revenues, and SALE is the change in sales
compared with the sales amount in the previous period. PROD is the sum of the cost of goods
sold and the change of inventory cost. DISX is discretionary expenses as measured by the sum
of selling and administrative expenses. Ai,t-1 is total assets in the previous period. Otherwise, to
capture total level of earnings management as a comprehensive proxy, we multiply abnormal
CFO and abnormal DISX by -1, then, construct real earnings management (REM) by summing
Abnormal Production, Abnormal CFO and Abnormal DISX.
3.3 Regression Model and Variable Definitions
We construct the following regression model to examine the consequence of real earnings
management on performance of post-M&A: 
ROA = b0 + b1REALDAC + b2LEV + b3LSH5 + b4HERFINDAHL_5 + b5SIZE + b6OPINION + e (4)
Variables Definitions
▽ROA the change of return on assets in subsequent year compared with the year of M&A
DEALDAC the total of real earnings management which is measured by abnormal PROD subtracting abnormal CFO minus abnormal DISX
LEV the book value of debt divided by the book value of assets at the end of year
LSH5 the sum of the top five shareholders' shareholding ratio
HERFINDAHL_5 the sum of the squares of the top five shareholders' shareholding ratio
SIZE the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of year
OPINION the virtual variables of audit opinion type at the end of year where number 1stands for qualified and clean audit opinion, otherwise 0
Table 1. Definition of variables
In order to eliminate the influence of endogenous (Bushee, 1998), the data of LEV, LSH5,
HERFINDAHL_5 and SIZE are at the end of preceding period of M&A. 
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4. Empirical Results and Analysis
We denote the current period of M&A announcement as event window 0 (a period concludes six
months). According to the above (1) - (3) models respectively, real earnings management
degree is calculated by five different time windows around M&A based on cross-sectional
financial data from 2006 to 2011. Table 2 shows real earnings management degree and
examining results. It’s not difficult to find abnormal cash flows and abnormal discretionary
expenses are significantly negative yet abnormal production costs significantly positive. The
results support our Hypothesis 1. It illustrates rational managers of acquiring firm engaging in
earnings inflate in the current period of M&A in order to convey successful signals to the capital
market and enhance investor’s confidence. However, In the second period post-M&A, abnormal
operating cash flows and abnormal production costs show opposite sign, indicating that real
earnings management is unable to continue.
Time -2 -1 0 1 2
AB-CFO
Z-value
0.018
（1.53）
-0.002
（0.13）
-0.180
（-1.96）**
-0.008
（-0.57）
0.034
（1.70）*
AB-PROD
Z-value
0.025
（1.30）
0.026
（1.44）
0.058
（1.83）*
0.023
（1.04）
-0.027
（-1.83）*
AB-DISX
Z-value
-0.015
（1.20）
-0.020
（-2.30）**
-0.012
（-2.16）**
-0.007
（-0.73）
-0.010
（-0.15）
Notes: ***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level, **Signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Table 2. Acquiring firm’s real earnings management degree and examining results
Mean Median Max Min
ROA(-1) 0.022 0.023 0.193 -0.392
ROA(0) 0.045 0.036 0.382 -0.079
ROA(1) 0.035 0.031 0.238 -0.235
ROA(2) 0.030 0.034 0.230 -0.222
Table 3. Distribution of time series of acquiring firm’s performance around M&A
Table 3 presents distribution of time series of acquiring firm’s performance around M&A. It
shows that acquiring firm’s performance in current period is the highest, then, continues to
decline in the two periods of post-M&A. Is under-performance of post-M&A related to real
earnings management in current period of M&A? We will examine empirically through the OLS
regression. 
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Variety Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4
cons 0.128 (0.93) 0.131 (1.05) 0.134 (1.11) -0.001 (-0.03)
Realdac -0.061** (-1.99)  -0.615** (-2.03) -0.062** (-2.10) -0.051* (-1.82)
opinion 0.034** (2.38)  0.034** (2.49) 0.034** (2.54) 0.034** (2.49)
Lev -0.021 (-0.44 ) -0.021 (-0.46) -0.022 (-0.49) -0.050 (1.27)
size -0.021 (-0.44) -0.015 (-0.99) -0.016 (-1.14)
lsh5 -0.012 (-0.19) -0.013 (-0.26)
herfindahl_5 -0.004 (-0.04)
adjust-ar2 0.21  0.24 0.28 0.26
Notes: ***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level, **Signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Table 4． Empirical results of consequences of real earnings management on subsequent
performance of M&A
Table 4 shows that real earnings management in the period of M&A is an important explaining
variable for under-performance of post-M&A. The level of real earnings management increases
1% and return on assets falls by 5% - 6% in the subsequent year of M&A, statistically
significant. Acquiring firms engage in real activities manipulation in the period of M&A by
maintaining high operation performance in order to convey successful information about firms’
prospects to the capital market. Although real earnings management enhances earnings in the
short run, it fails to maintain high performance forever. Real earnings management has a
negative effect on future cash flow. Once business strategy returns to normal one, operating
performance is on the decline. In addition, audit opinion is significantly positive related to M&A
performance. In contrast with non-standard audit opinions, the performance of acquiring firms
providing standard audit opinions is better, which is consistent with the study result of Fang
and Jin (2011), who argues that acquiring firms providing clean audit opinions have high
governance quality and high internal control quality and have inhibitory action on earnings
management. 
5. Research Results
This paper investigates whether acquiring firms attempt to adopt real earnings management
strategy to upward reported earnings in the period of M&A and the impacts on performance of
post-M&A. Our results demonstrate that acquiring firms exist real activities manipulation to
overstate earnings in the period of M&A for the purpose of improving market confidence.
Meanwhile, we also find that real activities constructed deliberately are temporary and bring
about under-performance of post M&A. Therefore, Investors, analysts and regulators cannot
ignore more hidden opportunism behaviors underlying reported earnings and the impact on the
performance of post-M&A when they use financial statements to evaluate acquiring firms. Only
in this way, can they make rational judgments and decisions. It is necessary to improve
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outside supervisory mechanism and strengthen construction of honesty and faithfulness so as
to realize the main purpose of value creation in M&A.
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